The Enigma of an Implementation Surplus
Sweden and the Global Ozone Protection Regime

Evert Vedung

Implementation researchers tend to discover deficits in the execution of government interventions. Against this backdrop, the case of Sweden and the global ozone protection policy is a puzzling exception. Not only are the directives of the global ozone protection regime-the Montreal Protocol with revisions-fully implemented, but also the policies adopted were meant to produce a considerably swifter phase out of the dangerous chemicals than the one prescribed in the global regime. Why did the Swedish political leadership opt for an implementation surplus and not a deficit? The implementation surplus is enigmatic also in light of public choice theories such as the Tragedy of the Commons and the Public Goods theory.
One might say that Sweden is always an enthusiastic implementer of international treaties. Faithful implementation is inherent in Swedish political culture. But this is really not the case with all environmental matters. Sweden has been slow to take measures for biodiversity and for the curbing of greenhouse gas emissions.
Part of the explanation is that states often want to comply with regimes of less importance in order to influence other states to comply with regimes of greater importance. Another group of explanations are concerned with domestic factors such as the winning of elections, the building of coalitions, and the covering up of the relative negligence of other environmental issues much more costly and but much more pressing according to public opinion. The CFC implementation surplus served as such a diversion to cover up nuclear power nonimplementation.

Evert Vedung
Professor of political science, esp. housing research

Uppsala University, Institute for Housing and Urban Research (IBF)
P O Box 785, SE-801 29 Gävle, Sweden
Phone: +46 (0)26 4206500, or +46 (0)26 4206515; telefax:+46 (0)26 4206501
Email: Evert.Vedung@ibf.uu.se